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Abstract—Multi-party and multi-layer nature of 5G networks
implies the inherent distribution of management and orchestra-
tion decisions across multiple entities. Therefore, responsibility
for management decisions concerning end-to-end services become
blurred if no efficient liability and accountability mechanism is
used. In this paper, we present the design, building blocks and
challenges of a Liability-Aware Security Management (LASM)
system for 5G. We describe how existing security concepts such as
manifests and Security-by-Contract, root cause analysis, remote
attestation, proof of transit, and trust and reputation models can
be composed and enhanced to take risk and responsibilities into
account for security and liability management.
Index Terms—Liability, network slicing, 5G, trust and reputa-
tion models, Security SLAs (SSLAs).
I. INTRODUCTION
5G is claimed to satisfy the dramatically growing need of
users and things for diverse services and massive connectivity
in future networks. Indeed, 5G networks are expected to be
multi-access to serve around 7 trillion heterogeneous con-
nected things, amongst which 20 billions are human-oriented
devices, with 1000x higher mobile data volume per area
and 10x-to-100x higher user data rate, as stated by the 5G-
PPP partnership [1]. In addition, 5G is envisaged to be an
extremely flexible and dynamic network to fulfill the myriad
of use cases and verticals with very different requirements
such as ultra-low latency or ultra-reliability. As an enabler
to meet the service levels expected by verticals, 5G slicing is
proposed to deploy several logical networks on top of the same
infrastructure. In that setting, each slice is optimized to fulfill
certain objectives imposed by specific use cases [2]. Network
softwarization via Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) technologies is a key
paradigm for implementing 5G slicing.
This technological revolution in communications and net-
working implies the shift to more enriched business cases or
advanced consumer services where multi-party 5G networks
with slicing are crucial. However, this situation requires open-
ing up a 5G infrastructure (e.g. towers, gateways, networks) to
third parties (e.g. mobile devices, IoT devices, VNF providers),
which raises many questions regarding the responsibilities
among partners. In absence of any prior trust relationship, the
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slice provider (SP) always bears the financial or legal impact
of fraud or mischief. The SP is legally bound by contracts to
provide the agreed QoS. Additionally, if there are accidents or
frauds in a critical service using a slice (e.g. due to an insecure
product or operation), the SP or any Slice Component Provider
can be liable.
In this multi-party and multi-layer 5G architecture, the def-
inition of liability and responsibilities when security breaches
occur is essential to support confidence between parties and
compliance with regulation, since zero-risk security cannot be
achieved. As in the “Y2K Act” [3], one can assume that, legal
and financial responsibility in 5G contexts will have to be
distributed proportionately among any liable parties involved
in a service. However, the appreciation of the stakeholder’s
liabilities is defied by 5G’s worldwide deployment, multiple
stakeholders and complex interconnections of hardware and
software at different levels. In addition to this, many different
orchestration entities appear at different layers in 5G networks,
such as the VIM, VNFM and NFV, which make multiple
decisions concerning the end-to-end service management with
partial views of the network. This implies that responsibility
regarding mismanagement and outages is blurred even within
the same administrative domain.
To address these challenges, this paper proposes to adapt
Security-by-Contract principles [4]–[6] to create a Liability-
Aware Security Management (LASM) system for 5G. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no prior work related to such
systems since existing systems only take into consideration
security, trust or performance as detailed in Section II. The
rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces
several key notions and related works, while Section III defines
the goals and requirements. The proposed LASM architecture
and its building blocks are detailed in Section IV. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper and provides insights on future
steps.
II. BACKGROUND
Several multi-party business models are possible in 5G,
where traditional services can be enriched by adding external
third-party functionalities. One example is the ”operator offer
enriched by partner” [11] shown in Figure 1. This concrete
example consists of enriching a connectivity offer from a
operator with a set of third-party applications. This third-party
application could be a VNF embedded in the same operator
premises.
TABLE I
LIABILITY CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY.
Name Definition
Trust The most important behavioural factor in managing relationships and in overcoming risks/uncertainty. It relies either on the
formalization of agreements (contracts), mutual confidence established by fruitful exchanges and acquaintance [7]. Trust is a
non-reciprocal (Ti,j 6= Tj,i) peer-based property where the trustor forms an opinion on how good the trustee is on providing a
specific service. It is the subjective degree of belief a trustor has on a trustee to perform a concrete task in this specific system
[8]. It depends on context and corresponds to a real number of positive collaborations between trust and trustee [9].
Reputation The collective opinion by members of a community and hence is a community-based property. It is a function of trust. In most
reputation models in the state of the art [8], reputation should be very difficult to earn and very easy to lose, especially when the
reputation concerns a management entity carrying out critical tasks.
Risk exposure A combination of 1) a Loss, the financial consequences of the risk and a peril, 2) the uncertain event provoking a loss and 3) an
object of risk, the exposed resource [10].
Responsibility A party’s capability to organize itself and potential delegates in order to achieve a task as agreed and to provide evidence on its
achievement.
Accountability Gathering evidences of the execution of a task in order to ”give accounts” or inform, explain why specific decisions have been
taken without any consideration related to a fault.
Liability Accountability towards legislation. Financial consequence of an outage, that can increase by actions or pre-conditions which increase
the probability or the impact of a potential danger [10].
In this example, the operator acts as intermediary be-
tween its customers (residential users and enterprises) and the
different third-parties necessary to provide those high-value
services. It becomes both provider and client (tenant), thus
with different responsibilities and rights in this high-value
chain. This example manifests that responsibility in multi-
party services is distributed among all partners. Indeed, in this
context, in addition to cooperation among partners, a minimal
level of transparency on how each partner manages its domain
is crucial. Trust and reputation mechanisms or security-by-
contract approaches can help to increase confidence between
partners. We consider for the rest of the article that partners
follow an strategic type of alliance, defined in the Etics project
[12]. In this alliance, each partner is an independent entity,
i.e. it has the sufficient autonomy to manage its domain.
However, the combination of autonomous domains may lead to
unpredictable and uncertain consequences regarding the end-
to-end service quality level offered to customers, mainly due to
the interaction of heterogeneous orchestration mechanisms of
each domain. With a liability perspective, we are particularly
interested in identifying the domain(s) or partners responsible
for fault(s) and outages in order to hold those domains
responsible for the damage inflicted upon customers.
Fig. 1. Multi-party and multi-layer 5G architecture for service delivery.
Liability is a multifaceted conceptualization with a large
set of associated concepts and terminology. In that regard,
Table I synthesizes definitions of liability-related concepts and
terminology from the perspectives of different domains such as
Artificial Intelligence [13], construction contracts [7], Access
Control [14], software development [15], trust modeling [9]
or insurance [10]. For instance, trust and reputation are key
concepts to build a Trust and Reputation Model (TRM), whose
goal is to distribute trust and reputation to assess the associated
risk in engaging in an interaction between two entities (trustor
and trustee). This risk is generally based on the experience
perceived by the trustor from past interactions with the trustee.
III. LIABILITY-AWARE SECURITY MANAGEMENT (LASM)
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work on a
LASM system for 5G slice management as existing manage-
ment systems only consider security, trust or performance. In
that regard, one example is [16], where an Information System
Security Risk Management meta-model including responsibil-
ity, accountability and commitment was used to create a multi-
agent system-based architecture for broadcasting forecasts and
alerts in a power distribution infrastructure. In [17], an adap-
tation of this model was proposed for a decision mechanism
for incident reaction in telecommunications network but it is
not adapted for the 5G Slicing context. A Security Panel was
proposed in [18] as a platform regrouping risk managers and
experts throughout the eSIM ecosystem and allowing them to
collect the information required for their risks analysis.
Giaretta et.al propose to use Security-by-Contract paradigm
for fog-based IoT management [6]. The decision to add an
IoT device in the local network, update or monitor it is taken
by matching the IoT device’s manifest with a security policy.
Costa et. al. [19] show that Security-by-Contract paradigm can
be extended to include models and KPIs for quantitative trust
management. However, responsibilities are implicit.
A. Ecosystem
As shown in Figure 2, we define the sliced 5G ecosystem
and how entities (blue boxes) and roles (persons) interact with
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Fig. 2. Ecosystem actors model.
technical components (yellow circles) of the infrastructure
based on [20]. We consider that a Slice contains hosting
equipment, VNFs, IoT and mobile devices.
The Slice Owner (SO) owns a Slice provided by a Slice
Provider with the intent of deploying a Service over it. A
Service Administrator manages the Service at application
level through a Service Manager. The SP’s Infrastructure
Administrator (IAdm) ensures that the SLA (Service Level
Agreement) or SSLA (Security Service Level Agreement)
of the Slice and its underlying Infrastructure are fulfilled
by defining and enforcing security policies through the In-
frastructure Manager. The Infrastructure is made of several
Components provided by a Component Provider (CP) and
tested or certified by a Validator (V). Either being physical
devices, virtual functions or sub-infrastructures operated by
a delegated third-party, Components may be part of a multi-
infrastructure (or multi-domain) fleet and managed through a
Fleet Manager. This is particularly interesting in those cases
where the Component is a part of the infrastructure and its
operation is delegated to a sub-contractor.
As a result of the Component definition, the Infrastructure
can have multiple layers of subsystems potentially operated
by third parties. In the rest of this article, we assume that the
Infrastructure Manager only manages a layer i of Ci Compo-
nents and does not manage the internals of any Component
in this layer. Each Component is considered as a black box
whose responsibility is to respect the SLA/SSLA and provide
the agreed KPIs.
B. Objectives
A LASM Infrastructure Manager (LASM-IM) assists the In-
frastructure Administrator (IAdm) by automating management
decisions to fulfill its commitments and obligations optimally
and by providing him insight on the taken decisions and the
overall status. As depicted in Figure 2, the Infrastructure Man-
ager interacts with the Service Manager to provide measures
and evidence that the requested SLAs/SSLAs are fulfilled.
It either acts directly on a Component or through a Fleet
Manager to enforce security measures. It gathers evidence of
the taken actions that can be aggregated for reporting purpose
or produced in a legal claim.
To achieve its mission, the LASM-IM should analyse each
new or updated Component to verify that its characteristics
comply with its obligations (SLA, regulation, Components’
requirements) and capacities in order to keep the threat and li-
ability levels at an acceptable level. After this risk analysis, the
LASM-IM proposes to the IAdm some recommendations on
the deployment or configuration of security services and Low
Level Security Policies, organization of the network topol-
ogy so that obligations are fulfilled while optimizing costs,
performance, risk exposure and liability level. Any potential
conflicting obligations should be notified to the IAdm for
information and resolution. The LASM-IM aims at preventing
incidents by using trust and reputation metrics and acting on
the Infrastructure. If a Component is not able to perform a
task because of loss of reputation or trust, its task should
be reassigned. In the case where issues occur nevertheless,
the LASM-IM collects evidence, reacts and notifies impacted
stakeholders so that they are able to analyse and mitigate it.
Since the SP and CPs are not necessarily acquainted or
bound by contractual relationships, it is necessary to formalize
the Components’ properties and conditions of use as a user
manual would do, i.e. the notion of Manifest. This Manifest
draws the boundaries of the liability of both the CP and the
SP.
IV. PROPOSED LASM ARCHITECTURE
A. High Level Architecture
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Fig. 3. LASM high level architecture.
LASM can be achieved by enhancing security orchestrators
with building blocks which allow to appreciate and establish
stakeholder’s liabilities. Manifests are the cornerstone of the
high level architecture illustrated in Figure 3 because their
authors commit on the correct description of the Components
features, security needs and provided security services. These
descriptions are then used as baseline for defining expected
behavior, setting security policies, configuring the Root Cause
Analysis (RCA) or Risk Assessment Graphs (RAG) modules
and calculating liability-related trust and reputation metrics
which measure how well Manifests’ authors respected their
commitment. Liability is further enforced by Remote Attes-
tation and Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) modules to
ensure non-repudiation of actions and compliance proofs. The
security orchestrator decides how the Infrastructure should be
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Fig. 4. Life-cycle of a Component and its manifest.
organized and managed using the optimal countermeasures
selected by RAG based on network topology and the liability-
related trust and reputation metrics. In presence of changes,
network failures and faults, the RCA can detect those changes
and inform RAG and TRM to improve countermeasure place-
ment and risk assessment in establishing new routes through
trusted and liable network elements or deploying VNF in
trusted and liable hosts.
B. Manifests
In the 5G ecosystem, several profiles and manifests coexist
implicitly referencing different responsibility levels. Their au-
thors can commit on properties as in the deployment template
of Virtual Network Function Descriptors (VNFD) [21], Net-
work Service Descriptors (NSD) [22] and the SUIT manifest
for IoT firmware updates [23]. Recommendations for control
on a Component’s usage can also be expressed as done by the
Manufacturer Usage Definition (MUD) profiles for IoT devices
[24]. Opposed to properties, recommendations imply that the
Manufacturer advises some controls on the Components but it
is up to the IM to enforce them.
We propose to combine characteristics of various existing
manifests in order to define and assign different levels of
responsibilities, as described in Figure 4. The desired man-
ifest is modular and follows the 5G infrastructure component
throughout its life-cycle. During the manufacturing phase,
the CP builds the component by using building blocks pro-
vided by software editors, hardware manufacturers or Ser-
vice Providers. CP provides a first version of the manifest
based on the description of features and preliminary usage
recommendations. Then, the Validator tests the component,
evaluates risks and compliance to applicable requirements.
Based on its observations, it can add properties or describe
controls or requirements, called usage constraints, that need
to be enforced by the SP to guarantee normal functioning or
avoid exploitation of a known vulnerability. The SP lists the
Component in its Catalog and may perform additional tests.
It identifies operation constraints, similar to usage constraints,
except that they express conditions to comply with specific
infrastructure requirements, company policy or local regulation
and are not available to other stakeholders. The SP uses the
manifest to decide how, where and under which conditions a
Component should be deployed. After putting the Component
in service, the SP uses the Manifest to decide whether and
how to observe and manage the Component. It can also be
used as a baseline to define expected behavior for monitoring.
Thus, each stakeholder is able to express its commitments
and expectations to/from other parties. In turn, this will help
SPs to formalize their risks and take decisions in order to
manage the level of risk of their infrastructures. In the future,
we will propose organisational and technical solutions to allow
the SP to publish and share manifests that it enhanced as part
of LASM system.
C. Root Cause Analysis (RCA)
An RCA algorithm is a fault management technique to
pinpoint the responsible entity causing a disruption. In our
context, it indicates to which extent how faults propagate
through the network and eventually lead to service failures.
This entity may be a network component, a management entity
performing an incorrect action, or even a networking service
not working on the expected conditions. In general, RCA
algorithms reason over a network model (model-based RCA)
comprising all analysed networked elements and services as
well as the detected alarms or symptoms. We can classify RCA
techniques mainly in two classes. On one hand, topology-
aware approaches exploit a network model comprising the
network topology. Therefore it only considers how faults in
network resources impact other network resources, whereas
impact of faults in network resources on services or clients
is not then considered. On the other hand, service-aware
approaches are an extension of topology-aware approaches
to take into account the impact of faulty network resources
on services as well as the clients using them. We propose
a topology-aware RCA and its extension as service-aware
RCA in [25] for SDN-NFV infrastructures. This framework
discovers the network topology from a given SDN controller
and instantiates a set of predefined templates describing inner
dependencies for each discovered networked resource and
generates on-the-fly a probabilistic dependency graph that
includes the physical, logical, and the virtual dependencies
of networking services. The RCA algorithm can then identify
the root cause of failures in real-time and update the network
model if the physical or virtual network topology changes.
D. Trust and Reputation Management Systems (TRM)
As noted in Section II, TRMs are generally used to assess
the risk of a given interaction between two elements (a trustor
and a trustee) within a system. Reputation models for web
services and telecommunications can be classified on how
reputation is assessed (i.e. subjective, objective, hybrid) but
also on how those are mathematically built (i.e. probabilis-
tic approaches, deterministic, fuzzy approaches) [26]. Trust
and reputation models have been applied to many different
technologies with very different purposes, mainly security. A
first example is wireless sensor networks, where the equip-
ment is hardware-constrained and very easily compromised.
A trust and reputation model can be used to evaluate the
trustworthiness of the captured information on an equipment
[8]. A second example is cognitive radio networks, where the
spectrum information provided by the sensing units must be
verified by means of a trust and reputation model to make
sure interference between the secondary users and primary
users (legitimate users have the right to transmit in those
frequencies) does not occur.
Nevertheless, there are plenty of other different purposes,
such as mobile ad hoc networks, where network nodes have
freedom to choose which nodes they use as relay to exchange
information. Trust and reputation models can be applied to
this context to assess how trustworthy the nodes are based on
their performance when transmitting packets. The nodes can
collect evidence on their past interactions with their neighbours
and rank them based on their trustworthiness and reputation
and choose those most trustworthy and renowned neighbors
to optimize the throughput [8]. Trust and reputation models
can be also used for automating the decisions regarding the
choice made by a user of a virtual network over multiple
virtual networks claiming to cater for a given level of service
to that user [27]. A hybrid reputation model was proposed
by [26] to assess the Quality of Experience in the context
of web services, where QoE and user context are subjective
metrics and QoS and QoE aggregation are objective ones. In
addition, there are some TRMs for softwarized networks, such
as the trust model based on reputation scores to evaluate SDN
controllers proposed by Mughal et al. in [28]. Betge-Brezetz
et al. in [29] propose a trust-oriented controller proxy that
intermediates between the controllers and the data plane by
making sure the flows sent by different controllers are correct.
Isong et al. in [30] propose to include trust between SDN
applications and the SDN controller to control how efficient
is the use of the networking resources by the SDN applications
and prevent attacks.
E. Remote Attestation, Proof Of Transit, and TEE
TEE [31], Remote Attestation [32] and Proof of Transit
[33] are complementary technologies which can be coupled to
deliver evidences that the Components comply with specific
constraints that are required to establish trust. Indeed, the TEE
ensures that the host OS cannot access to the VM or container
memory space. Remote attestation verifies the integrity of
software components while Proof of Transit ensures that
all packets follow a pre-defined path across a set of pre-
determined nodes.
F. Risk Analysis Graphs
Among existing risk evaluation models, attack graphs [34]
rely on graph theory to describe how existing exploits may
be chained to get root access to a system (also called an
attack path). This kind of mathematical model offers several
advantages such as providing a compact way to express
different possible attack scenarios on a system. Furthermore,
the use of a graph offers a rather intuitive support for justifying
the provided countermeasures or assessment measures to non-
experts. Dependency graphs [35] are also based on graph
theory and aim at modeling the inter-dependencies of the
different components of a system. These types of graphs are
mostly used to decide what would be the best answer against
ongoing attacks, while attack graphs are used to give a risk
assessment measure of the system.
The concept of Risk Assessment Graphs (RAGs) [36] has
been developed to extend these models to a new framework
that captures simultaneously the topology of a system, the
vulnerabilities, the accessibility between the components, their
external exposure, and the way all these elements may evolve
over the time. Thus, RAGs provide a framework for fine
qualitative and quantitative risk assessment approaches: to
assess the impact of the vulnerabilities exploitation and their
exposition surface throughout the nodes of the graph, to com-
pute risk indicator metrics and to observe their evolution over
several time periods. More precisely, the system is represented
as a directed graph in which a node can be either an asset-
vulnerability pair or an access point (Figure 5). An arc in
the RAG means that the exploitation of a vulnerability of the
source node exposes the target node to the exploitation of its
vulnerability. A path corresponds to a potential violation of
a node. A potentiality function and an accessibility function
are also introduced in the model. The former evaluates the
likelihood of each attack at each time slot. On the other
hand, the accessibility function gives the ratio of time the
system assets are accessible from each other at each time
slot. The accessibility and potentiality functions are used to
evaluate, respectively, the nodes and the arcs at each time slot.
Last, RAGs could be used as an input to determine the best
strategies to secure a system. Given a set of available coun-
termeasures associated to the vulnerabilities (ranging from
firmware updates or patches to VNF deployments), several
optimization models have been developed to solve security-
issue optimization problems [37], e.g., where to place counter
measures a priori to mitigate the risk of a chain of exploits.
An interesting research question is the online variant of this
problem where the optimal placement of counter measures is
decided over time.
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Fig. 5. RAG with one access point (red triangle) and three asset-vulnerability
nodes (blue circles). Accessibility values are given on the arcs.
G. Security Service Level Agreements (SLAs)
SLAs have been extensively investigated for cloud and tele-
com infrastructure. Among them, Security SLAs for Cloud In-
frastructure [38] need to be adapted for network infrastructure
and slicing. For this, research should identify Key Performance
Indicators (KPIs) to measure security and investigate how to
aggregate them so that administrators are able to optimize their
orchestration choices to maximize SSLA compliance. These
KPIs should illustrate the security level of the end-to-end
Slice, the interface between Slice Owner and a Slice Provider
or between Slice Providers and subcontracted Component
Providers. Other challenges such as defining publicly verifiable
proofs of compliance, automated incentives and penalties [39]
should also be investigated.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper defines the concept of a LASM System and
proposes an architecture to achieve this vision inspired by
Security-by-Contracts. It leverages existing technical modules
such as SSLAs, RCA, RAG, TRM, Remote Attestation, TEE
and manifests. The INSPIRE-5Gplus project will pursue this
work by building a LASM Proof of Concept, investigating the
challenges highlighted for each technology, evaluating their
relevance and added value to manage the liabilities of each
component and tenant.
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